Tresaro(TRE)区块链项目白皮书.pdf

Distributed Peer-to-Peer Marketplace Provides Support for Charity and Crowdfunding Georgi Georgiev Matt Wilkinson, Ph.D. Javor Ninov https// DRAFT V0.12.2Abstract I. Introduction II. Problem identification III. Tresaro - the decentralized marketplace for charity donations and crowdfunding with optional arbitration system1. Goals2. Functional structure; economic and fairplay incentivization3. Architecture3.1. TRE SWARM Servicing Protocol TRE-SWARM3.2. TRE Smart Contract Set TRE-SCS4. Order and transaction flow5. Content delivery6. Rating system7. Optional Arbitration System OAS8. Carriers9. KYC IV. The TRE token - planning, distribution and economy1. World Marketplaces and Charity - quick figures2. The Tresaro TRE token economy outline3. TRE token allocation, distribution and sale4. Preliminary Roadmap Acknowledgment REFERENCES 7 10 10 11 11 11 14 14 15 17 17 17 18 18 20 page 3 3 5 6 17 20 21 Whitepaper Table of ContentsWhitepaper 3 Abstract I. IntroductionMarketplaces exist to remove risk from peer-to-peer trades and enforce penalties on any actors that misbehave. They also play an important role as rating agencies - enabling customers and sellers to rate those they have transacted with and provide a level of reassurance to others considering a trade with either party. The idea of a fully distributed, peer-to-peer marketplace arises naturally with the advent of the completely decentralized blockchain public ledgers.There are many implementations of digital marketplaces using various blockchain technologies, utilizing different sets of protocols, added value services and incentives. Naturally, these plats are concerned with user-to-user seller-to-buyer, buyer-to-seller, arbitrage-to-buyer - Talisha is having a pair of kid’s clothes she can’t use anymore and is willing to sell for tokens. She also wants to donate these tokens to a cancer research foundation. The Tresaro market model gives the following options to the participating peers Bob, Talisha, the orphanage and the cancer research foundation - Sell the clutter to somebody willing to buy it and keep the tokens as a future financial prospect; - Sell the clutter to somebody willing to buy it and fully or partially donate the tokens from the trade to a charity or crowdfunding of choice. In our case, Bob will donate his tokens to the orphanage, while Talisha will donate hers to the cancer research foundation. Bob Talisha Sell Item Sell ItemWhitepaper 5 While these options seem trivial, their dynamics raises the following set of possibilities - Charities synergy and cooperation. Usually charities are competing for a single pool of resources donations 5 . The Tresaro market implicitly turns this competition into cooperation. For example, if the orphanage needs Talisha’s kid clothes, it could use the tokens, donated by Bob’s tablet trade to pay Talisha and receive the clothes; - Clutter envisioned as added value in a predominantly consumer society 6 . This is the psychological breakpoint where every participant in the trade is having some kind of inherent incentive; - The inherent clutter value in TRE tokens as trading and donation instrument instead of a direct value asset. Thus token market value is not just related to the trading levels, but also to the extent of charity and crowdfunding support; - Charity auction support. If the clutter item is designated solely for charity or crowdfunding, it could be auctioned either at the highest proposed price or for the cumulative price range of all the participants willing to fund the charity, no matter whether they receive an item or not. In the er case, the item is received by the party proposing the highest price; - Rating system, based on trading feedback successful and failed transactions, arbitration polls success rate whenever requested and donation statistics quantity, repeatability, spread or narrow charity spectrums.Any trade could have an undesired outcome for at least one of the participating peers. Usually this is the buyer, the side receiving a traded good or item. Thus another desirable property of the Tresaro marketplace is the Optional Arbitration Systems OAS, based on polls and incentivized by commission from the disputing sides. Any marketplace peer who doesn’t participate in the deal of interest, and who is having at least 16 successful consecutive trades and rating above 32 points, could apply for an arbitrator. The arbitration system is thus community-based, while employing different incentivization mechanism for promoting arbitration application and fair judgment. Tresaro’s arbitration mechanisms are described in details in the following sections. Tresaro’s decentralized marketplace will solve a set of pressing, real-world problems that are inherent within the centralized nature of marketplaces, charities, and crowdfunding campaigns in the current landscape. Carefully identifying these problems has ined the very core and structure of our distributed marketplace solution. Tresaro SWOT analysis is addressing two major groups of issues - business ideological and operational technical. Tresaro business agenda specifies the following list of pressing problems - Centralized marketplaces are not even optionally trustless. No peer-to-peer trading is possible. Arbitration is not optional as well; II. Problem identificationWhitepaper 6 - Clutter marketplaces are scarce. Decentralized clutter marketplaces do not exist; - Clutter is usually discarded as any kind of valuation in any context 6 ; - Charities are competing the same pool of resources donations 5 ; - Some major part of charity and crowdfunding donations is spent on solving logistic or side problems - mediation fees, administrative expenses, OpEx, international transfers, induced fraud and many others 7 . Combining clutter, marketplace, charities and crowdfunding conceptual economies in a decentralized ecosystem with an optional arbitration layer is a challenging technical and operational task as well. Operational pressing problems include - Decentralized economy - generic, cheap, real-time decentralized key-value KV storage. - Planned to store user, transaction and market-related metadata. Desirably operating off- chain to fulfil the ‘real-time’ and ‘being cheap per transaction’ requirements; - Decentralized economy - off-chain node incentivization system and distributed economy base; - Decentralized economy - community-driven arbitration process; challenges - ‘lynch mob’ and ‘syndicate’ prevention; - Decentralized economy - arbitration incentivization system; - Decentralized economy - user and arbitration ratings; - Distributed marketplace - decentralized network build process - The Startup Core; - Distributed shipping - a network of localized carriers; - Distributed shipping - incentivization; - Distributed Arbitration - poll system and incentives; - Distributed Auction - procedures and contracts. 1. GoalsTresaro’s decentralized marketplace model targets a well defined agenda of goals, based on the set of pressing problems described in the previous section. This includes addressing both the business and technical challenges. Our SWOT analysis outlines the following list of goals - Completely decentralized, incentive-controlled economy for all functional peers. That is - anybody, obeying the fairplay and providing or requiring service, could be any kind of functional peer. Obviously, operationally-critical peers would require mandatory KYC identification licensing; - Serving charity and crowdfunding specific-operations - token donations, needed items delivery, auctions; - Decentralized marketplace - optional trustless peer-to-peer trades. Optional peer- III. Tresaro - the decentralized marketplace for charity donations and crowdfunding with optional arbitration systemWhitepaper 7 to-peer carriers for physical goods shipping. Optional dispute resolution with implicit arbitration protocol; - Turning charities competition into synergy. A charity could spend some of its token donations to buy anything it needs from within the same marketplace, thus supporting another charity; - Creating an incentive to trade clutter, instead of throwing it away. Adding a share-like value to clutter in the of tokens; - Adding a moral value to clutter by supporting different charities and crowdfundings; - Giving additional plat to the charities and crowdfunding initiatives; - Using the public ledger technology for transparent trading and fraud prevention. 2. Functional structure; economic and fairplay incentivization The Tresaro model resolves and requires the following list of functional network participantsSELLER - Peer wishing to exchange goods including clutter for tokens or wishing to directly donate goods for a cause. SELLER could donate fully or partially tokens from a sale to a cause;BUYER - Peer wishing to possess particular goods including clutter in exchange for agreed token value. The same peer may donate arbitrary amount of tokens to a cause on top of the received goods’ cost;CROWDFUNDING - Peer looking to raise funds for a personal or undisclosed cause. If the peer has passed KYC it becomes a licensed crowdfunding;CHARITY - Peer looking to raise funds for a particular charitable organization;ARBITER - Peer servicing the arbitrage polls as a voter. Arbitrage polls are Tresaro’s mechanism for mediating disputes between peers. To register as ARBITER, a peer must have at least 16 successful consecutive trades and rating above 32 points and to pass the KYC identification process;CARRIER - Peer servicing the shipping of the physical goods. Any locally-licensed carriers or entities with rating above 100 points, that have also passed KYC, could apply for CARRIER function;SERVER - Peer servicing distributed KV storage for T resaro functional metadata - transactional, user-related, marketplace-related, etc. KYC is required;KYC NODE - Peer servicing know- your-client KYC identification. A physical peer could possess the characteristics and purpose of several or all functional participants. For example, a peer could sell goods, buy clutter, be a charity and arbitrate at the same time, effectively being SELLER, BUYER, CROWD FUNDING and ARBITER.Whitepaper 8Simply having these types of network participants peers implicitly solve logistic marketplace problems is not enough for a functional decentralized economy. That is, every peer needs to have one or ideally several economic incentives to participate. Adding complexity to the situation is the fact that some incentives require reaching certain ‘critical mass’ node quantity to function as expected. The following comparative table clarifies the incentivizations of any of the peer types, while norming the incentives by the ‘critical mass’ criterion underscoredThere is an implicit incentive that corresponds to any peer type - the rating. Ratings stimulate fair play between peers. Lower rated peers have a lesser chance of remaining as active in their related functional perance on the marketplace. Various types of ratings are achieved by function-dependent, automatic or user feedback. Table I Functional Peers, their incentives and ratingsselling goods and clutter;donating to a cause;good transactional rating.buying goods and clutter;donating to a cause;good transactional rating.receiving funding and needed items;having a plat for the cause;good charitable rating.receiving funding and needed items;having a plat for the cause;good charitable rating.receiving a commission;receiving bonus if participating in majority vote;good arbitration rating.receiving funds for the service;having a plat;donating to a cause;good carrier rating.receiving commission from SELLERs and BUYERs;receiving commission or service from other SERVER nodes for relaying and storing data;donating to a cause;good server rating.receiving funds for the service;good KYC rating. Functional Peer SELLER BUYER CROWDFUNDING CHARITY ARBITER CARRIER SERVER KYCNODE Incentives